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Globalisation, Revenues and the Differentiation of States 
Mick Moore 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
The governance-and-development agenda that has dominated thinking since the collapse of 
the Soviet Bloc is fast losing credibility. It continues to be associated with a set of countries, 
ideas and experiences – the ‘West’ – that no longer enjoy global leadership. It has not 
usefully identified the role of governments in promoting economic growth. And it takes little 
account of the ways in which states are changing. The growing influence of the BRICs and 
other emerging powers is now widely appreciated. This paper explores the ways in which 
late twentieth century globalisation is bringing about more subtle changes in the political 
constitutions of states that may have considerable implications for the ways in which we are 
governed and the actions that may be needed to reduce the incidence of bad governance. 
Contrary to widespread expectations, globalisation does not necessarily lead states to 
become more like one another, or to converge around the ‘Western’ model of liberal 
democracy and market capitalism. It also leads states to compete with one another. To the 
extent that they compete by seeking alternative sources of revenue, this may lead them to 
diverge politically. The concept of political revenues – the incomes that governments and 
political elites obtain through the exercise of political power – is central to the analysis. One 
of the consequences of late twentieth century globalisation is that, in some countries, 
opportunities for political elites to gather (illicit) elite political revenues have expanded 
considerably. This helps explain why fragile states have become a normal feature of the 
global system. A more widespread consequence is that states enjoy a range of new non-tax 
revenues in addition to ‘normal’ tax revenues. This has significant implications for the 
accountability of governments to citizens. 
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Introduction 
 
Two decades ago, immediately after the Soviet Bloc fell apart, leading statesmen from 
Western countries made a series of high profile statements about the centrality of ‘good 
governance’ to the development prospects of poor countries. OECD donors, who at that 
point were almost the sole source of development aid, began to link their money to 
governance reforms. The governance-and-development agenda – henceforth ‘the 
governance agenda’ – was born.1 It was a geo-political phenomenon, rooted in part in a kind 
of Western triumphalism following the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the credibility of 
central economic planning. But it was also in part constructed by development professionals 
to reflect interpretations of the recent experiences of sub-Saharan Africa in particular 
(Lancaster 1993), and was based on four broad assumptions (or assertions) about 
development. First, for (largely unexplored) reasons, developing countries, especially in 
Africa, suffered from bad governance, that in turn largely explained their failure to rise out of 
poverty. Second, there was a set of governance institutions and practices that, if judiciously 
chosen and adopted in poorer countries, would expand the supply of a number of good 
things simultaneously – more tolerant, accountable and democratic rule, more effective 
public institutions, and faster rates of economic growth. Third, those improved institutions 
and practices would be identified mainly from within richer countries. Fourth, richer countries, 
especially as represented through their aid activities and their consultancy companies – and 
in alliance with reformers within developing countries – would have the prestige, authority 
and capacity to stimulate significant institutional reform. 
 
Opinions on the governance agenda have been diverse. It has been viewed as misconceived 
or as commonsense; and as neo-colonial and arrogant or as progressive and bold. Whatever 
the truth about the competing claims, it was certainly ambitious. It placed some rather 
prominent hostages in the hands of fortune. They include in particular (a) the claim that the 
adoption of the right kinds of reforms would accelerate rates of economic growth; (b) the 
assumption that the liberal democratic institutions of the West would (continue to) enjoy 
unmatched prestige elsewhere in the globe; and (c) the expectation that the West could use 
the aid relationship to support radical institutional reform. These expectations were not 
nonsense in the early 1990s, when the Soviet Bloc had just collapsed; the recent economic 
performance records of Africa and Latin America were dismal; popular pressures for more 
democracy were being felt by the one party, dictatorial or military regimes that ruled most of 
Africa; the Japanese economic miracle was coming to an abrupt end; most of the old 
industrial economies were performing modestly well; the market-centric policy ideas labelled 
neo-liberalism were in the ascendant; and the main institutions of global economic 
governance were firmly under the control of the OECD nations. The world of 2011 is a very 
different place. Most evidently, the prestige and power of the West have declined 
appreciably. The OECD economies are not only among the most sluggish in the world, but 
the economic policies of their governments are clearly the major cause of what might still 
become a ‘double dip’ global recession. American electoral politics have become so 
dysfunctional that the capacity of any American government even to manage its own 
economic problems is seriously in doubt. Similar concerns have generated a rolling 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The G8 has become the G20, which includes Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and 
Turkey. It is the turn of the Chinese government to lecture the Americans about economic 
mismanagement. Relative to the waves of democratisation in Latin America and the Soviet 
Bloc in the 1980s and in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, the Arab Spring of 2011 had less 
direct Western inspiration or support, and was to some extent directed against Western-
supported rulers. Democracy is increasingly separable from Western values or culture. There 
is much talk of the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and of a range of other 
                                                 
1  For analysis and commentary on how that agenda appeared at the time, see Moore (1993). 
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middle level powers – several of whom are developing large aid programmes – and of how 
China is in various ways out-competing the West in Africa and elsewhere. Rather than using 
aid for policy leverage, the more traditional aid donors increasingly have to seek out 
governments willing to accept their money. There is a skeletal new consensus about 
development policy that owes little or nothing to the experiences or advice of the West 
(Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011). In particular, programmes for regular government cash 
transfers to poor families, which are rooted mainly in Latin American experiments, are 
spreading steadily within poor countries (Gelb and Majerowicz 2011). Phrases like ‘South-
South learning’, that once seemed wishful pieties, now have substance. 
 
It is not only the declining power and prestige of the West that has undermined the old 
governance agenda. It is now clear that the agenda was wrong in relation to the issue on 
which governments of poor countries tend to focus most: economic growth. The strongest 
claim was that reforms in accountability, the constitution, the policymaking process, public 
expenditure management, the investment climate, or the law and the judicial system were 
essential to improved economic performance. The underlying theory was always suspect.2 It 
is now evident that there are no reliable correlations between rates of growth and measures 
of the quality of governance.3 Improvements in the kind of processes measured in the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators – voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption – are welcome events likely to make life more tolerable for many people. But they 
will not directly make them wealthier. The economies of most poor countries are currently 
performing well. But, insofar as we can identify a reason, it seems to lie mainly in high 
international prices for their commodity exports. The deeper causes of inter-country 
differences in rates of economic growth remain as puzzling as ever.  
 
In sum, the old governance agenda is fast fading. It has already in part transmuted into a 
security agenda: the involvement of richer countries in the governance of the poorest parts of 
the world is increasingly being justified as a means of suppressing sources of terrorism, 
piracy, drug production and smuggling, arms proliferation and trading, disease, and people 
trafficking. But the redefinition of the problem on the part of the rich world does not mean that 
the underlying governance problems have gone away. While we should be sensitive to bias 
in the ways in which the issues are defined and labelled, we cannot escape the fact the old 
governance agenda did arise in part from some appalling failures and abuses of authority 
within poor countries. Those problems persist, and other governance challenges have 
become more evident in much of the rest of the world. A number of OECD governments lack 
the political authority to manage their own economies and treasuries in a responsible way. 
Much as we might admire the performance of their economies and some of their policy 
innovations, the BRIC countries are in no sense alternative models of good governance. 
Democratic Brazil and India are mired in corruption. The Chinese and Russian regimes find it 
very hard to deliver on their side of the bargains they have imposed on their populations: 
security and effective developmental governance in exchange for authoritarian rule. Although 
the Chinese Communist Party has exhibited an impressive capacity to adapt to and direct 
change, there is a significant possibility of political instability in the medium term. 
It is likely that future debates about issues of governance, whether within poor countries or 
globally, will be framed in less polar terms than in recent decades. We will no longer start 
with the expectation that there is a distinct set of problem countries (failing or weak states, or 
even developing countries generally) in need of external attention or intervention and another 
set of fortunate nations ready with solutions. What else might we be concerned about in 
                                                 
2  Dani Rodrik has been particularly influential in his criticism that the governance agenda places too much weight on the 
form of institutions and not enough on the functions they perform. The one cannot always easily be read off from the 
other (Rodrik 2005). 
3  Of the many published critiques of the governance agenda, I find Andrews (2008) especially insightful and useful.  
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discussing governance the year after next? I suggest in this paper that the underlying pattern 
of states and public authority might be changing more fundamentally than is generally 
appreciated. It is not simply, as is now widely understood, that (a) as new powers are 
emerging, the world is becoming multi-polar and (b) institutions of global governance are 
gradually, if haphazardly, expanding their remit. I suggest that, contrary to most expectations, 
globalisation may be leading to more differentiation than convergence in forms of national 
governance. I focus on those differentiation processes that are driven by changes in sources 
of what I term political revenues – the incomes that governments and political elites obtain 
through the exercise of political power. To date, the processes of differentiation have been 
most evident in the poorer parts of the world. To a significant degree, they explain the recent 
emergence of the phenomenon of failing or weak states. But the differentiation processes are 
more widespread, and contribute to another phenomenon that should concern us: the 
growing extent to which governments are financed from non-tax revenues. As I explain 
further below, when governments have opportunities to raise significant revenues without the 
need to interact or negotiate with their taxpayers, their accountability and commitment to the 
common good are at risk.  
In Section 2, I review the scholarly literature on the effects of globalisation on states. It has 
been unduly focused on OECD (or advanced capitalist) states and on the questions of 
whether they have lost power to markets and how they have adapted to the increased 
economic competition associated with globalisation. The prevalent notion that globalisation 
has contributed to convergence around a particular type of state able to deal with this 
competition leaves the impression that globalisation tends to breed political convergence. But 
some basic theory suggests that we should also expect divergence. Before presenting my 
hypotheses about the ways in which globalisation might be differentiating states (Section 5), I 
first present the understanding of the political economy paradigm that underpins my work – 
fiscal sociology (Section 3); and then summarise those features of late twentieth century 
globalisation that are most relevant to understanding its effects on public authority in the 
poorer parts of the world (Section 4). The core argument about the new sources of political 
revenues generated by late twentieth century globalisation, and their effects on states, is in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1 The debate on globalisation and public 
authority 
 
I use the term globalisation in its most general sense to refer the increasing frequency and 
intensity of interactions across different parts of the globe (Scholte 2000). There is broad 
agreement among scholars that a period of globalisation in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was followed by an era of retraction and nation-centricity that lasted from 
World War One until approximately the 1960s. That was succeeded by a further period of 
intense globalisation that can in most respects be dated from the 1960s and 1970s. Let us 
label it the late twentieth century globalisation. Some of its most visible manifestations are: 
the rapid expansion of international trade, fuelled in part by the containerisation revolution 
(Levinson 2008); the even faster growth of transnational capital movements; and the 
enormous improvements in long range communications consequent on the marriage of 
telephony and digital technologies. The process continues, albeit in modified forms. So too 
does the scholarly debate on the impact of globalisation on states and on public authority. 
Although that literature is large and diverse, it is possible to provide a brief, useful summary 
without resorting to caricature. 
 
There is a common point of departure for this debate about the impact of late twentieth 
century globalisation on states: an image of the typical OECD state at the starting point, in 
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the middle of the twentieth century. Its defining characteristics include (a) the rooting of 
political and military institutions in individual countries; (b) the attribution of a distinct 
nationality to most economic enterprises, including those operating transnationally; (c) the 
continued orientation of states to inter-state military conflict and to the possibility of large 
scale inter-state warfare; (d) major legitimating roles for mass membership parties in the 
political realm and, in the administrative realm, for distinctive, centrally-controlled, 
accountable Weberian state civil and military apparatuses; and (e) the dedication of 
significant state resources to popular welfare (the ‘welfare state’). This was taken as the 
typical state on which globalisation was to impact. 
 
What was that impact? There seems to be less scholarly agreement now than earlier. The 
pioneer scholar, and in many respects the founder of the discipline of international political 
economy, Susan Strange (1996), was known and cited above all for the argument that 
globalisation was empowering international markets and international market actors at the 
expense of governments and political institutions generally. That broad proposition remains 
popular, but has been challenged in two main ways. One set of scholars emphasise counter-
trends: the ways in which the increasing importance of transnational economic transactions 
might actually increase the size or power of the state (Cameron 1978; Rieger and Liebfried 
1998; Rodrik 1998; Weiss 2005).4 The other challenge, the ‘transnationalisation thesis’ 
(Orenstein and Schmitz 2006), is less direct. Its proponents emphasise what Weiss (2005) 
calls ‘entwinement’, i.e. the ways in political institutions and processes hitherto rooted in 
individual national states increasingly engage with, influence and co-construct one another, 
to the extent sometimes of creating a space for genuinely global policymaking and 
administration (Stone 2008)5 – and in that sense help protect political power from drowning 
under rising market forces. 
 
My concern here is less with the empirical validity of these differing conceptions of the 
political impact of globalisation, and more with the ways in which arguments are framed, and 
the assumptions that are implied. A prominent theme in much of the literature is that, as the 
threat of large scale inter-state warfare has diminished and globalisation has intensified 
market competition, states have been focusing less on military competition with one another 
and more on economic competition. At least in the eyes of its most cited theorist, this new 
competition state (Cerny 1997) is forced to give priority to national economic competitiveness 
at the expense of welfare-ism. The proposition about declining welfare-ism seems over-
stated. And, as Palan et al. (1999) have argued, relatively inclusive, social democratic 
welfare-ism can be quite consistent with international economic competitiveness for some 
states. However, Cerny’s contentions that it is international economic competition that is to a 
large extent driving changes in the political character of (OECD) states, and that those 
changes are similar from country to country, seem to be shared by a range of other theorists, 
including those engaged with a related, loosely-defined and variously-labelled set of ideas 
about changes in institutional configurations (‘architecture’)6 and in modes of rule that I will 
label network state (or network polity) theory. 
 
The central proposition of network state theory is that the mode of exercising state authority 
is changing: away from one-way command-and-control type activities initiated from within the 
formal state apparatus (‘Weberianism’), toward more two-way, informal, exchange 
relationships that cross formal organisational boundaries. The capacity of the benchmark 
1950s OECD state was believed to have derived to a large extent from the financial and 
organisational resources that could be mobilised in command-and-control mode within the 
                                                 
4  See also Evans (1997) and Kahler and Lake (2004). 
5  In which ‘authority is more diffuse, decision making is dispersed and sovereignty muddled’ (Stone 2008). 
6  There is a parallel between the argument I am making here and Peter Evans’ critique of what he terms the 
‘institutionalist turn’ in social science. Just as classic (especially Marxian) political economy tended to emphasis the role 
of interests at the expense of an understanding of the role of institutions, contemporary institutionalism tends to err in 
the opposite direction (Evans 2007). 
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formal state apparatus. In the network state model, state capacity derives more from the 
strength of – and ability to mobilise – networks and connections within the state apparatus 
itself, across states, and between state and non-state actors. One characterisation of this 
difference, by one of the most convincing proponents of the notion of a networked polity, 
reads:  
 
In the networked polity, states are strongly embedded in society and pursue their 
objectives by operating through networks of societal associations. Both state agencies 
and societal associations take the form of ‘network’ or ‘organic’ organizations – 
decentralized, team-based organizations with strong lateral communication and 
coordination that crosses functional boundaries within and between organizations. 
These organizations are then linked together by means of cooperative exchange 
relationships around common projects. The role of the state is to empower 
stakeholders and facilitate cooperation among them. 
Organizations in the networked polity are network organizations: organic rather than 
mechanistic; heterarchical (many-to-many relationships) rather than hierarchical 
(many-to-one relationships); and built upon diffuse and/or social exchange rather than 
discrete and/or impersonal exchange. In the networked polity, as in policy networks, a 
multiplicity of organizations with overlapping jurisdictions engage in cooperative 
exchange rather than in competition. 
(Ansell 2000: 303 and 308–9) 
A range of other scholars writing on the evolution of the contemporary state make similar 
arguments that also focus on changes in the institutional architecture of the (OECD) state 
(Jayasuriya 2004; King and Lieberman 2009; Rhodes 1996).7 The concept of the regulatory 
state – a state that engages more in rule-making and less in taxing and spending (Majone 
1997) – is a little different from the concept of network state, but is quite congruent, 
particularly in the emphasis on the relational capacity of the state to interact effectively with 
non-state actors.  
 
Scholarship on the impact of globalisation on public authority has focused heavily on the 
richer and more powerful states, as if they constituted the norm and the template,8 and has 
implied that they are all tending to change in the same direction. But how plausible is that 
claim, conceptually or theoretically? I am employing the most general definition of 
globalisation: the increasing frequency and intensity of interactions across different parts of 
the globe. What would we expect to happen when any random external process brings into 
closer interaction a set of entities that have the potential both to compete among themselves 
for scarce resources and positions and to cooperate for collective benefits? Evolutionary 
biology and the social sciences, especially economics, suggest that we might expect 
conflicting consequences. On the one hand, these entities are likely in some respects to 
cooperate more with one another and, through processes that organisation theorists label 
isomorphism, come to emulate and to resemble one another more closely. The existing 
                                                 
7  The late Charles Tilly made a parallel but broader argument about the evolution of contemporary politico-economic 
institutions in a paper provocatively titled ‘Welcome to the Seventeenth Century’. Tilly suggested that we are moving 
away from the institutional configurations characteristic of twentieth century capitalism – defined by the complex 
relationships between relatively consolidated states and relatively bounded firms – toward the kinds of looser, less 
bounded institutions that were the norm in the seventeenth century (Tilly 2001). 
8  Conversely, area specialists dealing with the poorer parts of the world, above all with sub-Saharan Africa, have tended 
to engage in particularistic debates that barely even acknowledge the potential impact of globalisation. The concept of 
the (neo-) patrimonial state has exercised a major influence in African studies in recent decades (Bratton and Walle 
1994; Chabal and Daloz 1999). The core proposition underlying neo-patrimonial theory is that inter-personal 
relationships and linkages in the non-state sphere are so powerful and compelling that they overwhelm any attempt to 
create a distinct public institutional realm. Neo-patrimonialism is barely a theory about ‘the state’ at all. The concept 
addresses neither globalisation nor transborder phenomena of any kind: indigeneity rules almost completely. It fails to 
make the grade as a useful concept on a range of criteria, including consistency of use, verifiability, or correspondence 
to evidence (Pitcher et al. 2009; Therkildsen 2005). 
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literature on the implications of globalisation for states and public authority refers mainly to 
these kinds of homogenising processes. On the other hand, evolutionary biology also tells us 
also to anticipate contradictory processes: increased interaction among a set of entities is 
likely to intensify pre-existing competition among them for resources and positions, and 
therefore stimulate processes of niche-seeking, specialisation and differentiation. States are 
not biological entities. But they have many features of organisms, compete with one another 
for resources and positions, and are clearly capable of learning and adaptation.9 We should 
at least explore the extent to which globalisation might in some respects encourage 
differentiation. I do that in Section 5. But first, in Section 3, I explain the theory – the fiscal 
sociology paradigm – that leads me to focus on political revenues as key variables affecting 
these processes of state differentiation; and in Section 4 I summarise some key 
characteristics of late twentieth century globalisation. 
 
2 The fiscal sociology paradigm and political 
revenues 
 
The intellectual foundations of fiscal sociology go back to the work of Rudolf Goldscheid and 
Joseph Schumpeter a century ago. In recent years their ideas have been rediscovered, and 
typically are introduced with the quotation of a few purple passages. From Goldscheid: 
 
…. the budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies 
(Schumpeter 1918/1991: 100)  
 
And from Schumpeter: 
 
The fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its general history. 
In some historical periods the immediate formative influence of the fiscal needs and 
policy of the state on the development of the economy and with it on all forms of life 
and all aspects of culture explains practically all the major features of events; in most 
periods it explains a great deal and there are but a few periods when it explains 
nothing. 
Our people have become what they are under the fiscal pressure of the state. 
 
(Schumpeter 1918/1991: 100–1)  
 
In this incarnation, fiscal sociology constituted a set of broad assertions about the great 
political, economic and historical significance of fiscal variables. It is best viewed as a meta-
theory about grand patterns of societal evolution intended to compete with the ideas of Marx 
and Weber.10 It was animated to a large degree by an aspect of the history of European 
states that fascinated Goldscheid and Schumpeter and has stimulated more recent historical 
research (Daunton 2001: 1–5): the evolution from rulers’ fiscal dependence on domain 
revenues (i.e. income from their own properties) to dependence on broad general taxation. 
Goldscheid and Schumpeter considered the emergence of this tax state to be a defining 
feature of modernisation in Europe, key to the emergence of effective states, and an intrinsic 
component of the rise of bourgeois society and of democracy. The tax state – and its 
successor fiscal state, that was organised so that it could borrow heavily from private capital 
markets against assured future tax revenues – became so much the European and then the 
global norm that most contemporary social science, especially in development studies, 
                                                 
9  For some stimulating ideas on this issue, see Palan et al (1999). 
10  Musgrave’s review puts Schumpeter’s work on the tax state into context in a very enlightening way (Musgrave 1992). 
10 
2 
 
 
largely ignored the fact that some states are financed very differently, and that this may have 
significant consequences.11 
 
The strength of the fiscal sociology paradigm is that it inspires and focuses attention on 
variables that for much of the twentieth century disappeared almost entirely from political 
science and political economy.12 The weakness of the original was that it lacked any explicit 
basis in behavioural theory: there are no behavioural micro-foundations, and no clear 
propositions to test. That is a remediable problem. In my view, a solid behavioural core to 
fiscal sociology is be found in organisation theory: the proposition that the structure of 
complex organisations, and the behaviour and strategies of their managers, are influenced 
the location of their key resources and the means they employ to access those resources 
(Pfeffer 1982; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). That proposition can easily be extended to 
encompass those complexes of partially coordinated organisational networks that we call 
states. In recent years, a body of more explicit and testable propositions has begun to 
emerge, most of it from research relating to developing countries. There is now a substantial 
literature that explores the implications of the fact that, unlike virtually all OECD states for the 
past century and more, many states elsewhere in the world do not finance themselves mainly 
from general taxation, but depend on a range of other sources, most notably the rents from 
oil, gas and other natural resources, and development aid (Brautigam et al. 2008; Chaudhry 
1989, 1997; Dunning 2008; Gervasoni 2010; Martin et al. 2009; Moore 2004, 2007; Prichard 
2009, 2010a; Winters 1996). Insofar as there is a core proposition, it is that governance is 
better where the behaviour of political authorities is constrained by a need to negotiate and 
bargain for their key financial resources with the actors – mainly but not only taxpayers13 – 
who will be most affected by the ways in which these resources are used. Conversely, 
political authorities that enjoy revenue that does not have to be ‘earned’ politically are more 
likely to abuse their power (Moore 1998). 
 
I define the fiscal sociology paradigm as the proposition that the sources from which public 
authorities obtain their revenues, and the ways in which they organise themselves to relate to 
revenue providers, exercise a major influence over politics and governance. We should not 
define ‘public authorities’ too narrowly. In many contemporary developing countries in 
particular, small elites, operating partly through state institutions, but to some degree 
autonomously, act as powerful gatekeepers between the outside world and their own 
economies and polities. In order to take adequate account of the incentives and opportunities 
they face in their inter-mingled private and their public roles, I make a conceptual distinction 
between two main categories political revenues, i.e. the material incomes obtained through 
the exercise of political power. The first are state revenues: the incomes of states or other 
legally constituted public authorities – from taxes, non-tax revenues, and grants from other 
states or international organisations. These revenues are almost always legal. The second 
category, that I term political elite revenues, accrues to non-state entities through their 
exercise of formal or informal political authority. They include the incomes that corrupt 
politicians, military men, public servants, warlords and gang-leaders obtain when they: 
cooperate in illicit drugs, arms or other trades; steal money from the public purse or the 
public through the misuse of authority; or take effective control of parts of the economy, 
levying their own political profits.14 Political elite revenues generally are illegal. In practice, 
                                                 
11  It is not difficult to assemble long lists of books that deal with the recent politics and political economy of developing 
countries with barely a mention of fiscal and revenue issues. In relation to contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, Herbst 
(2000) constitutes an honourable exception. 
12  The contemporary policy issue that helped animate Goldscheid and Schumpeter’s work was whether and how the tax 
state and the capitalist market economy could coexist without one destroying the other. They had different views 
(Musgrave 1992). Radical scholars have sometimes returned to this dimension of their work when the governments of 
advanced capitalist countries have faced fiscal crisis (Block 1981). 
13  The same idea animates much insightful literature on government-business relations (Bates 2001; Winters 1996). 
14  There is some overlap between what I term political revenues and the more familiar concept of rents – or sovereign 
rents (Knack 2009) – which is often used in political economy to refer to any return on assets that in some sense derives 
from the exercise of power. I do not use rents for two reasons. First, this would be likely to stir up the diversionary issue 
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the boundaries between state revenues and political elite revenues often are unclear. For 
example, some of the ‘fees’ that timber merchants pay to fell trees in state forests might be 
legal and some illegal. Of those that seem legal, some might get to the public treasury while 
others end up in other pockets. It is difficult to understand politics and state formation in 
poorer countries in particular unless we recognise the potential motive power of both state 
and elite political revenues and appreciate the ambiguous, shifting character of the border 
between them. Part of the argument of this paper is that, especially within developing 
countries, late twentieth century globalisation has led to increases in state non-tax revenues 
relative to tax revenues and in political elite revenues relative to state revenues – a reversal 
of those trends in European fiscal historical that seemed so significant to Goldscheid and 
Schumpeter. Before making that case, I need to explore more the features of late twentieth 
century globalisation. 
 
3 Late twentieth century globalisation 
 
The contemporary phase of globalisation, which I term late twentieth century globalisation, 
can be dated from around the 1960s. I listed in Section 2 what I would regard as the most 
generic features of that process: the brisk growth of international trade; the even faster 
expansion of transnational capital movements; and the rapid increase in long range 
communications consequent on the marriage of telephony and digital technologies. To 
understand the implications for states and political authority, we need to add in some more 
specific features of the late twentieth century globalisation process and the context in which it 
occurred. From the perspective of poorer countries in particular, the following seem 
especially important:  
 
 International income inequality: late twentieth century globalisation took place when 
average income disparities between the richest and the poorest countries were at the 
highest levels ever recorded.15 This inequality impacts on some other factors listed 
below. For example, the existence of high income markets in one part of the world 
generates large markets for commodities that, because they are either scarce (oil, gas, 
many minerals, diamonds) or illegal (drugs), generate high rents for those who control 
the sourcing in poor countries (see below).  
 Liberal and secretive international finance: the growth since the 1960s of opportunities 
for people and organisations who control large amounts of capital to move their money 
around the world easily and safely, and to store it in a wide range of jurisdictions that 
offer combinations of low taxes and secrecy (Cohen 1996).  
 Rising natural resource rents: the big increase from the early 1970s in the rents that 
governments in the poorer part of the world obtained from their control over point natural 
resources – mainly oil and gas, and also some minerals. This is partly because of the 
absolute increase in mining and extraction activities in the global South, notably in sub-
Saharan Africa, but also because per unit profits and rents on oil in particular have 
tended upwards since the early 1970s.16 
                                                                                                                                                        
of whether taxes can usefully be considered as rents. Second, some rents may not derive directly and visibly from the 
current exercise of political power, and thus fall outside political revenues as I conceive them. For example, the De 
Beers company long obtained significant rents from its control of the international diamond trade. However, it would be 
misleading to equate these rents to political revenues. They also owed a great deal to smart and active management 
and marketing (Smillie 2010).  
15  For example, Maddison (2001) estimates that the ratio of per capita incomes between the richest countries and the 
poorest was about 2:1 in 1500, 3:1 in 1700, 9:1 in 1900, and 20:1 in 2000. See also Pritchett (1997). The rapid growth of 
a few Asian economies in recent years has yet to impact significantly on this long term historical trend. 
16  A relatively sophisticated database on the size of these rents, by country, is available on 
http://go.worldbank.org/3AWKN2ZOY0. Until World War Two, developed countries collectively were largely self-
sufficient in energy resources: mainly coal, with significant domestic oil production in the United States. Their 
dependence on oil from the Middle East (and Venezuela) increased considerably in the 1950s and 1960s, but in a 
context where the governments of the main oil producing states (Venezuela, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya) 
were generally dependent on and subservient to the United States and Britain in particular. But the balance of power 
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 The new drug economy: since the middle of the last century, there has been a big 
increase in illegal rent-taking opportunities from producing drugs in poorer countries and 
in trafficking them into rich countries. One cause was increasing wealth and growing 
consumer demand in rich countries. Another was the growth of air travel. The third was 
symbolised by the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs: the creation, under 
American leadership, of an activist, punitive global anti-drug regime that increased the 
monetary rewards for producers, traffickers, and the people in authority who were bribed 
to cooperate with them.17 
 The new aid economy: there was a steady growth of the aggregate volume of 
international development aid and its increasing concentration, especially from around 
1990, on the poorest countries, such that aid became a major source of income for 
several dozen governments, mainly small, and many in sub-Saharan Africa (see  
Section 5). 
 The re-commercialisation of military capacity: Before late twentieth century globalisation, 
it was widely understood that military service had been ‘nationalised’, in the sense that 
military organisations and personnel were expected to serve only their ‘own’ nation state. 
Correspondingly, mercenary activities were considered archaic and a violation of basic 
principles of identity and loyalty. However, in the course of globalisation, military service 
to some degree has been re-commercialised, in three different ways. First, the growth of 
UN peacekeeping operations has provided income earning opportunities for units of 
national armies that are low cost, disciplined, and relatively unaffected by the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Second, the militaries of the rich countries, above all the US, have begun to 
out-source a large proportion of their military and military support operations to private 
enterprises, because of both the growing complexity of military logistics and the 
increasing importance of electronic military equipment that can be designed and 
operated by specialists whose skills otherwise have a range of non-military uses. The 
distinction between military and non-military equipment and skills has been considerably 
eroded. Third, fuelled in part by the two previous processes, there has emerged in 
recent decades an unregulated international market for military personnel and services 
that provides opportunities for wealthy governments and elites to dispense with 
domestically-recruited regular national military forces. Given wealth, they can protect 
themselves and project their power by hiring military force on global markets.18 
 
This brief characterisation of late twentieth century globalisation, especially as it impacted on 
poorer countries, puts us in a position to sketch out the impacts on political revenues in 
different parts of the globe. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
gradually shifted from Western governments and companies to local politicians. OPEC, founded in 1960, was able to 
take advantage of oil shortages in 1973 to engineer production limits, rapidly push up the price to what were considered 
crisis levels, and at a stroke transfer something like 2 per cent of the world’s GNP from oil purchasers into its own 
coffers. That set in train two processes that, amid all the volatility of the oil industry (and increasingly the natural gas 
industry), have continued up to the present. First, the average rents from oil and gas production have been very high, 
and governments have generally succeeded in capturing a very large proportion for themselves, to the extent that they 
have become wealthy and potentially very powerful. Second, the large relative decline in the North American 
contribution to global oil and gas production has been substituted by new sources, nearly all in areas with few non-
energy income sources: Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia and parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Harris et al. 2009). 
17  The many good sources of information on the drug trade and its political consequences include the UNODC’s annual 
World Drug Reports and (Bayart et al. 1999; Ellis 2009; Jojarth 2009; Keefer et al. 2008; Kohnert 2010; Reuter 2008, 
2009; Scott 2003; Van der Veen 2003).  
18  Among the many sources on this issue, see (Avant 2005, 2006; Roberts 2006; Scahill 2007; Sheppard 1998; Singer 
2003). 
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4 Globalisation, political revenues and 
public authority 
 
In our benchmark situation, around 1960, the rich (OECD) states and some Latin American 
states were what Schumpeter termed fiscal states: advanced tax states that could borrow 
heavily on the strength of assured future tax revenues. Basic tax states, with limited access 
to private capital markets, were the norm in most of the rest of the world. Most political 
revenues were state revenues, and most state revenues came from broad, general taxes – 
as opposed to grants, other non-tax revenues, or taxes derived from a very small number of 
resource extraction enterprises. Two regions of the world provided the main exceptions. One 
was the Communist-ruled sphere covering China, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
Here governments mainly financed themselves directly through their ownership and control 
of most productive enterprise under the central planning system – a system that has now 
disappeared almost entirely. The other exception was small in scale in 1960: some Middle 
Eastern rulers were already living – some very well – from oil export revenues.19  
 
In some countries, late twentieth century globalisation has tended to maintain or reinforce the 
benchmark pattern, bolstering state revenues as much as, or more than, political elite 
revenues, and doing so through the channel of broad general taxation. This seems to be the 
case to date with the OECD countries and a number of (larger) non-OECD countries that 
have impacted significantly on the global economy through increasing exports of 
manufactured products (China, South Korea, Taiwan), non-mineral commodities (Brazil), and 
relatively tangible services (India). I focus here on the other countries, which are to be found 
outside the ranks of the OECD and the BRICs/emergent economies, and generally are poor 
and small in population terms. In response to late twentieth century globalisation, a range of 
new sources of political revenues has become more important. They challenge the 
dominance of the OECD norm of state dependence on broad general taxation, and might be 
seen as replacements for the previous ‘alternative’ to that norm – direct state control of 
productive enterprise – that has now largely disappeared (see above). My tentative 
classification of the new sources of political revenues is: (i) illicit political elite revenues  
(ii) point natural resource revenues (iii) sovereign wealth revenues (iv) property development 
revenues (v) pirate sovereign revenues and (vi) sovereign transfers. These sources to some 
degree blend into one another, and map only very roughly onto political jurisdictions. Many 
national governments and elites obtain revenue from several of these sources 
simultaneously. Some sources tend to serve sub-national rather than national governments, 
or vice versa. Almost all of them to some degree provide both state revenue and political elite 
revenue simultaneously. The list begins with those sources that have the highest element of 
political elite revenues – and are most closely associated with the weak and fragile state 
phenomenon – and ends with those with the highest state revenue component, which 
therefore are the least likely directly to undermine political order – although they might 
support exclusionary and authoritarian forms of order.  
 
4.1 Illicit political elite revenues 
Illicit elite political revenues accrue to people and groups who exercise some political power, 
and typically use it to ensure that state agents help rather than hinder their activities, where 
‘helping’ can extend from simply turning a blind eye (e.g. to drug smuggling) to active 
assistance (e.g. in providing false documentation to facilitate illegal trade in arms or 
diamonds). Globalisation has increased the rewards from many illicit activities through the 
reduction in communications and transport costs, and the consequent increased incentives 
                                                 
19  Scholars were already beginning to suggest that these Middle East oil-fuelled polities were distinctive rentier regimes 
(Mahdavy 1970). 
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for people located in poorer countries to meet market demands in the rich countries. Some 
activities in this category, including people trafficking and the production and trading of 
counterfeit medicines and other goods, are relatively dispersed over the globe (Naim 2003) 
and small in terms of the sums of money involved and the perverse incentives that they 
create for the active weakening of state institutions and public authority. Other relatively 
small scale illicit rent-generating activities – like permitting the illegal felling and export of 
tropical hardwoods (Ross 2001a) and turning a blind eye to illegal factory fishing in the 
territorial waters of African states (Standing 2008) – are more concentrated in a few 
locations. Large scale piracy is a recent entrant into the category. Although now expanding 
off Benin and Nigeria, it has been concentrated mainly off Somalia, where it reflects the 
combination of the near-collapse of state authority there and proximity to a major shipping 
lane. In its current form, the pirate economy of kidnapping ships and crews for ransom is very 
much a product of globalisation. It is a viable large scale business because of the 
combination of modern communications, the London lawyers who act as intermediaries 
between representative of pirates and ship-owners and insurers, and the international private 
security firms that deliver the ransom money. 
 
On the global level, the two main sources of illicit elite revenues in recent decades have been 
diamonds and drugs. As recounted in detail by Smillie (2010), illicit diamond production and 
trading emerged as a direct cause of political breakdown, conflict and misery in West Africa 
and Angola in particular. Several factors interacted to increase the demand for diamonds, 
shift the diamond economy even further out of the purview of the state and the tax man, and 
encourage international smuggling. They include: growing affluence in Western consumer 
markets and a wider range of uses for industrial diamonds; increasing air traffic, which eased 
international smuggling; and the fact that, before the full flowering of what I have termed 
above liberal and secretive international finance, diamonds were a very convenient means of 
expatriating wealth anonymously from poor countries and storing it in more secure 
jurisdictions. Greed and kleptocracy in Africa certainly helped exacerbate conflict around 
diamonds. So too did greed in Europe, and the uninterest of national authorities there in 
regulating or even keeping useful records of the diamond trade (Smillie 2010). However, 
without the changes in the global context listed above, the diamond wars that took place in 
and around Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone from the 1970s until the end of the century 
might never have happened, and would certainly not have been as ferocious.  
 
The existence of diamond deposits does not necessarily motivate political elites to 
undermine political and administrative order in order to enrich themselves. Context matters, 
and the characteristics of the diamond deposits are an important part of that context. Alluvial 
diamonds are found scattered over wide areas. In poorer countries, they are typically 
prospected by small groups of manual labourers, often working in remote areas. This 
provides seedbed conditions for the kinds of complex conflicts that blighted parts of West 
Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, and pushed the Liberia warlord Charles Taylor toward 
international notoriety. Finds of alluvial diamonds are unpredictable. Individual stones are 
easily concealed and smuggled across borders. State agencies find it hard to maintain any 
kind of control or tax system. Competition among financiers can easily escalate into armed 
conflict for control of territory and deliberate depopulation (Smillie 2010; Snyder 2006). By 
contrast, the extraction of deep shaft diamonds through large scale, capital intensive 
operations has much the same politico-economic consequences as the mining of other 
concentrated high rent products, including oil and gas extraction. It generates a surplus that 
enriches the existing governing authorities and tends to strengthen the state, albeit much 
more in its fiscal and military aspects than in terms of its legitimacy or capacity to mobilise 
citizens in the collective interest. As the recent history of Botswana exemplifies, deep shaft 
diamond resources give political elites incentives to pursue their ambitions and interests 
through working within, and strengthening, existing state or other large scale public authority 
structures (Acemoglu et al. 2003; Leith 2005; Poteete 2009).  
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It is too early to say how far the relative calm in the diamond fields since early in the current 
century reflects (a) the 2003 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme aimed at ending the 
‘blood diamond’ phenomenon;20 (b) the final defeat of (diamond-fuelled) UNITA in Angola by 
(oil-fuelled) MPLA in 2002; or (c) the fact that diamonds have lost some of their former 
attraction now that liberal and secretive international finance provides better ways of 
transferring capital transnationally and storing it securely offshore. It is clear that, at the 
global level and possibly also within West Africa, the growth of profits from the production, 
processing and shipping of drugs are turning diamonds into a relatively marginal source of 
illicit elite revenues. The illicit global drug market became significant only in the 1960s, in 
response to rising incomes in OECD countries, reduced international transport costs, and the 
emergence of an activist, punitive international drug control regime (Section 3). Consumption 
does not seem to be declining in rich countries, although they are becoming more self-
sufficient in cannabis and produce many of their own ‘designer drugs’. Drug use, especially 
of heroin, is increasing in most the producing and transhipment countries, and indeed in the 
poorer world generally (UNODC 2010). West Africa has become a major transhipment hub, 
with predictable consequences for the quality of local policing and customs services (Ellis 
2009). The effects are felt even in Ghana, otherwise one of Africa’s contemporary successes 
in governance reforms. The transport of drugs from Latin America to the US first had noxious 
effects on governance in much of the Caribbean. Partial successes in blocking those routes 
transferred much of the venom to Mexico. The Mexican government’s ongoing war on drug 
traffickers has in turn dispersed some of the toxic effects of the trade South, especially to 
Guatemala and El Salvador, but also to Belize, Honduras and Nicaragua. Absent major 
policy changes, there is currently little prospect of any change except the continuous 
relocation of the problem (Reuter 2008, 2009). 
 
4.2 Point natural resource revenues 
In quantitative term, rents from ‘point’ natural resources – i.e. minerals and energy – have 
grown in recent decades to become by far the biggest single source of political revenues.21 
Demand and prices have tended upwards in recent decades, and extraction activities have 
spread further into poorer regions hitherto considered too difficult, politically or technically. 
Relative to the 1960s and 1970s, resource rents are now less concentrated in the Middle 
East and North Africa, and have become more important around the Caspian Basin (the 
Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia) and in sub-Saharan Africa. Because the rents from 
mineral and energy extraction are so large, and because the extraction processes are so 
distinctive, concentrated and rooted in particular locations for long periods of time, we know 
more about the governance impact of political revenues from this source than from any of the 
others listed in this paper. In particular, we know three big things – and are close to a 
consensus on a fourth.22 The first is that the extraction of point natural resources in almost all 
cases greatly enriches the political elites who control the locations where the extraction takes 
place. It provides revenues to both political elites and states. The Al-Saud family has 
benefited more from oil than has Saudi Arabia. Even in more bureaucratically organised 
states with some elements of formal electoral democracy, state energy corporations, often 
described as ‘a state within a state’, are bastions of privilege and extra-constitutional power 
(de Oliveira 2007; Winters 1996). The second big thing we know is that the extraction of point 
natural resources tends to generate relatively exclusionary, monopolistic and militarised 
                                                 
20  Smillie (2010) suggests that the Kimberley process is failing. 
21  ‘Point’ natural resources are concentrated and extracted – normally mined – through large scale capital intensive 
operations. The political consequences are very different from the exploitation of agricultural and forestry resources, 
which almost by definition are widely dispersed, far less likely to generate high rents, and far less prone to monopoly 
capture. 
22  There is a large literature examining the diverse effects of large resource rents on politics and governance. Among the 
many sources, see (Aydin 2011; Bornhorst et al. 2008; Brunnschweiler 2008; Bulte et al. 2005; Collier 2006; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2005; Daniele 2011; de Oliveira 2007; Dunning 2008; Gelb and Grasman 2010; Gervasoni 2010; Ghazavinian 
2007; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Knack 2009; Malaquias 2001; Neumayer 2004; Omgba 2009; Oskarsson and 
Ottosen 2010; Ross 1999, 2001b, 2003, 2008; Smith 2004; Snyder 2006; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005; Stijns 2006; 
Torvik 2009; Tsui 2011; Vicente 2010; Weinthal and Luong 2006; Weyland 2009; Williams 2011).  
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governance, and to entrench governments in power for long periods of time. The third is that 
governments funded principally from point natural resource extraction tend to treat their 
citizens badly – in terms of civil and political rights, health and education services, and public 
infrastructure provision – because they have so little need of them. Natural resource wealth 
frees governments from their normal motivations to nurture at least some prosperous tax 
payers, affluent mass consumers, healthy and educated workers, appreciative voters or fit 
and skilled military recruits. Cash from oil and minerals obviates the need for a booming 
economy and tax revenues, and pays for the recruitment of (politically-docile) immigrant 
workers and mercenaries to provide essential skills. As recent events in the Middle East 
illustrate, such exclusionary political regimes contain the seeds of their own decay in the long 
term. However, the dominant effect of natural resource revenues in recent decades has been 
to stimulate and strengthen them. 
 
Finally, a recent research paper from the IMF, on the question of whether Ghana will be 
blessed or cursed by its new oil wealth (Aydin 2011) – see also Gelb and Grasman (2010) – 
articulates what I see as an emerging consensus: natural resources are not an inevitable 
curse; but there is strong evidence that they become a curse when they are exploited on a 
large scale in poor countries with weak pre-existing public institutions ; and this malign effect 
is closely associated, both as cause and as effect, with poor governance. Although there is 
hope in the long term, for the foreseeable future the curse may prove very ‘sticky’.23 
  
4.3 Sovereign wealth revenues 
A sovereign wealth fund is ‘a state-owned investment fund composed of financial assets 
such as stocks, bonds, real estate, or other financial instruments funded by foreign exchange 
assets’.24 The contemporary political significance of sovereign wealth funds derives from a 
combination of three main factors. First, they are new. The term itself was invented only in 
2005. The first fund, the Kuwait Fund, was established in 1953, but the pace of creation was 
slow until the 1990s. Most sovereign wealth funds now in existence have been established 
since 2000, mainly on the basis of large surpluses generated by exports of oil and gas and, 
for China, manufactured products.25 Second, sovereign wealth funds are, in terms of 
numbers, asset sizes, or asset sizes relative to GNP or to government revenue, very 
important in the Middle East, significant in Africa, Russia and Central Asia, China, and other 
parts of Asia, but insignificant in the ‘old’ industrial regions of Western Europe and North 
America.26 Third, sovereign wealth funds are characterised by lack of transparency. 
Excluding a few cases such as Norway, the people who control sovereign wealth funds 
typically release little information about them, and have considerable discretion over how the 
resources are deployed. Most of the public debate about sovereign wealth funds has taken 
place within OECD countries, and has focused on the potential threats to national security 
stemming from the purchase of strategic economic assets by agencies controlled by (non-
democratic) foreign governments. The implications of large sovereign wealth funds for the 
governance of nations that possess them are at least as important. They are ideal vehicles 
                                                 
23  Even if current experiments in North America at producing oil and gas from shale through hydraulic fracturing succeed 
and radically reduce world energy prices, many oil and gas extraction activities will continue to generate high rents. 
24  ‘These assets can include: balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of 
privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports. Sovereign Wealth Funds can be 
structured as a fund, pool, or corporation. The definition of sovereign wealth fund exclude, among other things, foreign 
currency reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or monetary policy 
purposes, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the traditional sense, government-employee pension funds, or assets 
managed for the benefit of individuals’ (www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings). Other sources on sovereign wealth funds 
include (Monk 2009; Saw and Low 2009; Weiner 2011; Xu and Bahgat 2010). 
25  Of the 49 contemporary sovereign wealth funds for which the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute provides data, 3 were 
established in the 1950s, 5 in the 1970s, 5 in the 1980s, 8 in the 1990s, and 28 since 2000. (www.swfinstitute.org/fund-
rankings – accessed 28 April 2011). 
26  Of the 52 contemporary sovereign wealth funds listed by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 17 are located in the 
Middle East; 6 in Africa; 3 in Russia and Central Asia; 5 in China and Hong Kong; 8 in other Asia and the Pacific; 4 in 
Latin America and the Caribbean; 6 in North America, Australia and New Zealand; and 3 in Western Europe. The Middle 
Eastern and Chinese funds are the largest (www.swfinstitute.org/what-is-a-swf - accessed 29 April 2011). 
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for money laundering of all kinds. Their assets and profits can easily be switched between 
overseas investments and the domestic economy and fiscal system. Sovereign wealth funds 
potentially liberate executive authorities from the need to negotiate with domestic taxpayers 
to obtain revenue, or to explain their expenditures to legislatures and voters.  
  
(iv) Property development revenues 
Sovereign wealth revenues derive from liquid, mobile financial assets largely held overseas. 
By contrast, property development revenues derive from the least liquid and least mobile 
form of domestic asset: land. The distinctive feature of the ‘property-development polity’ is 
that public authorities – and often political elites – derive much of their income from either (a) 
re-allocating rights in scarce land to other beneficiaries or (b) actively participating in income-
generating real estate development, including in public utilities like electricity and water 
supply and public infrastructure like ports, toll roads, and major international canals (Egypt, 
Panama). Many political jurisdictions obtain a little income from these sources. The matrix in 
Figure 1 helps explain the notion of a distinct property development polity. The matrix has 
two dimensions: the extent to which political authorities are actively engaged in property 
development or simply re-allocate land to non-state actors; and the extent to which these 
activities are conducted by national/central governments or by sub-national jurisdictions. For 
present purposes, the more significant property development polities are in the upper left 
quadrant, and it is on those that I concentrate here. 
 
Figure 1 
 Activist property development by 
political authorities 
More passive (or ‘rentier’) re-allocation 
of land rights to non-state actors 
 
 
(City) states 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Dubai 
Qatar 
Djibouti27 
Panama28 
Sri Lanka 
Sub-national jurisdictions Widespread  Much of contemporary China 
 
The pre-conditions for profitable, activist state-led property development are that land should 
be scarce and in demand. That in turn implies a major concentration of economic activities in 
a small territory. The first significant contemporary case of a property-development polity was 
Hong Kong under British colonial rule. That was followed by Singapore, especially after it 
became an independent state in 1965;29 and then more recently Dubai and a number of 
other small jurisdictions in the Gulf, including Qatar. In the absence of any systematic 
analysis of this phenomenon, I sketch out what appear to be the main features and causal 
processes. In all cases, a sense of political vulnerability has provided much of the motivation. 
The functions that have been developed to add value to real estate are to some extent given 
by nature and to some extent a matter of strategic choice. They tend to be synergistic. No 
single function seems essential. The more foundational seem to be: 
 
 Transhipment and re-export of goods: most property development polities began as 
ports serving a wider region. 
                                                 
27  See Brass’s (2008) account of the effects on politics in Djibouti of the high rent that can be drawn from American and 
French military bases and control of trade from Ethiopia. 
28  The case of the Panama Canal illustrates the complexities of the analysis here and the ambiguities of the concepts. The 
canal is well-managed by the autonomous Panama Canal Authority. However, it represents a large sunk investment that 
enjoys close to a monopoly on regional shipping routes, and semi-automatically generates large revenues for the 
government from canal tolls alone. Those revenues are largely ‘unearned’: the government does not need to work hard 
either to keep them flowing in or to retain the support of its citizens (Moore 1998). Panama scores low on many 
dimensions of good government, and especially low in the provision of education (The Economist, 16th July 2011: 53). 
29  Singapore is now so prosperous that income taxes are a major revenue source. However, in 2009 land sales still 
accounted for 8 per cent of government revenues, and investment income for another 14 per cent - 
www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/budget_2011/revenue_expenditure/toc.html. 
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 Naval facilities for global powers. 
 A haven of law, order and respect for property rights, especially in regions where these 
facilities were otherwise not easily available to enterprises owned by foreigners and/or 
operating transnationally. 
 A cultural refuge for members of transnational expatriate networks (e.g. the British in 
Hong Kong, Westerners in Singapore) or a recreation centre for wealthy people facing 
lifestyle restrictions in adjacent countries (e.g. Arabs in various Gulf states). 
  
On these foundations, property development polities have been able to make themselves 
attractive to investors and visitors by offering a range of other services, including various 
degrees of ‘income shelter’ services (tax havens, money laundering); leisure locations for the 
wealthy; iconic cultural facilities; nuclei for international financial service activities dependent 
on time-zone location; and regional and trans-regional airline passenger travel hubs. To 
some extent, this clustering of service activities reflects normal ‘economies of agglomeration’. 
But the existence of property development polities reflects something more. Their distinctive 
features derive from their roles as havens – for property owners seeking some security, for 
people wanting a predictable legal and organisational framework in which to conduct 
business, for foreign professionals working in alien cultural environments, and for wealthy 
people escaping lifestyle restrictions – in regions characterised by political instability, weak 
government support for private enterprise, or lax and unpredictable commercial law 
enforcement. The governance of property development polities reflects their ‘haven’ 
characteristics. Rulers offer capital owners and professionals a better deal than they could 
expect in adjacent jurisdictions, in return for the acceptance of very limited civil or political 
rights. Property developer regimes tend to be stable, exclusionary and relatively 
authoritarian.30 Their economies are very vulnerable to disruption caused by political 
instability. Their typical dependence on temporary immigrant workers, for both professional 
and manual skills, makes it easier to pre-empt both effective trades unions and mass political 
activism. The ability of states to fund themselves from property development reduces the 
need for significant binding consultation with taxpayers. Given cohesiveness among ruling 
elites and the loyalty of military and security services, property development polities face few 
internal political challenges.  
 
While the most distinctive property development polities have a long history as centres for 
entrepot activities, they have flourished in recent decades in consequence of the interaction 
of two sets of factors. The first is late twentieth century globalisation, including in particular 
the containerisation of international trade in goods and the growing importance of 
transhipment hubs;31 the expansion of air travel; the emergence of a large group of ‘global 
professionals’ with overseas job postings; and the growth of the international financial 
services sector. The second is various kinds of political instability and insecurity of property 
in the regions they serve.32 It is therefore difficult to predict how far existing property 
development polities will expand or how far new ones will emerge. Their viability depends on 
the lack of strong competition from other political jurisdictions in their neighbourhood for the 
capital, personnel and economic activity that they need to attract. The more elaborated 
property development polities are almost inevitably city states.33 Their potential numbers are 
limited. But the same processes that produce property development city states are also 
                                                 
30  At one end of the scale, the Dubai Executive Council does not have to respond to any organised consultative council, 
but is answerable directly to the ruler. Davidson (2008: 159) talks of ‘…. the government as a board of directors rather 
than as a forum for political participation.’ At the other end of the scale, Singapore is a ‘managed democracy’. The ruling 
Peoples Action Party has a broad membership base, is fused with the higher levels of the public service, actively 
recruits and nurtures political and bureaucratic talent, makes it very hard for political opponents even to contest 
elections, and has in consequence totally dominated the legislature since independence. 
31  This is often associated with illegal trafficking in people, arms, drugs and counterfeit goods (Davidson 2008: chapter 8). 
32  Conversely, lacking widespread, endemic insecurity, contemporary Western Europe has not given birth to significant 
property development polities. 
33  Hong Kong has never formally been independent, but first under British then Chinese control. Nevertheless, it has in 
practice enjoyed many of the features of an independent city state. 
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evident within larger countries and at sub-national level. Often because of a history of 
colonial, feudal or Communist rule, it is not unusual for governments to own a large 
proportion of (unused) land, or to have strong claims over it. Sri Lanka is one such case. It is 
much larger than a city state, but has a dense population and, because of its prime location 
on world shipping lanes and major tourist potential, is currently receiving considerable 
Chinese and other foreign investment in port, airport and other transport facilities, nearly all 
on land made available by the government. The Rajapakse family, that now runs the country 
as an elected dictatorship, plays a major role in these and other property developments. Sri 
Lanka is not Dubai, but there is significant convergence between the two.34 The extent to 
which sub-national governments in China are now funding themselves from land sales and 
property development – and therefore arguably perpetuating their autonomy from the people 
they are supposed to serve – is now a topic of significant comment and research (Man 
2011). Property development revenues are likely to continue to affect governance in parts of 
the world for the foreseeable future. 
  
(v) Pirate sovereign revenues 
Dubai, Qatar and other Gulf states compete with one another mainly by investing in improved 
infrastructure and other facilities to attract businesses, investment, depositors, and visitors. 
While there may be some costs to these states and to the rest of the world from this 
competition, many people view it positively, as doing what competition promises to do in the 
economic textbooks: stimulate improvement. One major category of (mainly new) political 
revenues depends on a less benign form of competition: political jurisdictions compete to 
appropriate directly for themselves the revenues that would otherwise accrue to other 
jurisdictions.35 They make themselves better off by making others worse off. A social scientist 
might label these ‘zero-sum sovereign revenues’. I prefer the more graphic term ‘pirate 
sovereign revenues’. 
 
The oldest significant contemporary form of sovereign revenue piracy derives from the 
willingness of the governments of Liberia and Panama in particular to register merchant 
ships as being ‘national’ in return for lower registration fees and less stringent regulations 
relating to vessel safety, environmental safeguards and labour conditions than those 
imposed by the genuine home governments of the ship owners. These arrangements for 
‘flags of convenience’ date back to Panama in the 1920s, but spread rapidly from the 1970s 
(Palan et al. 2010: 140), and now account for more than half the world’s merchant shipping. 
The sums of money involved are however very small in comparison to those involved in the 
more recent and now more contentious form of revenue piracy: tax havens. Much has been 
written recently on the subject. The details are complex, and the question of what is and is 
not a tax haven remains contested.36 But the essential points are clear. Tax havens are 
‘jurisdictions that deliberately create legislation ease transactions taken by people who are 
not resident in their domains, with a view to avoiding taxation and/or regulations, which they 
facilitate by providing a legally backed veil of secrecy to make it hard to determine 
beneficiaries’ (Palan et al. 2010: 236). More simply, tax havens allow a few privileged people 
to enjoy the benefits of great wealth free of any of the obligations that they might otherwise 
incur. They are characterised by high levels of secrecy and the ease with which companies 
and other legal entities, including trusts, can be established and registered. Tax havens are a 
defining feature of late twentieth century globalisation. Some have their historical roots in the 
nineteenth century, but their explosive growth dates from the early 1970s (Palan et al. 2010: 
108). 
 
                                                 
34  I write this as a Sri Lanka specialist.  
35  Some economists do defend this destructive competition. Their defences are plausible only if one accepts their strong 
assumptions about the inherent appetite of states for additional revenues and the benefits to society of restricting or 
reducing public income and spending to the maximum possible. 
36  For an excellent account of tax havens see Palan et al. (2010). Shaxson (2011) is a better read, but more partisan. 
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The author of one recent book on tax havens argues that a defining feature of tax havens ‘is 
that local politics is captured by financial services interests (and sometimes criminals and 
sometimes both), and meaningful opposition to the offshore business model has been 
eliminated’ (Shaxson, 2011: 8-9). This proposition becomes more plausible if we accept a 
distinction made by Palan et al (2010), that Shaxson himself does not make, between two 
types of tax havens. The first are tax havens in the narrow sense. These are secrecy 
jurisdictions that ‘remain mere “paper centers”, providing a home for shell companies and 
trusts, proxy banking institutions, and captive insurance companies’ (Palan et al. 2010: 27). 
There is little value added in these tax havens. They exist purely to facilitate the hiding of 
assets, money laundering and the evasion of tax. They employ very few people relative to 
the number of companies and other legal entities to which they are formally home. Their 
politics are indeed relatively exclusionary or authoritarian; where there is a clash, the 
interests of those who profit from tax havens tend to trump the interests of their indigenous 
populations. Drug traffickers and other international criminals often have a strong local voice 
(Palan et al. 2010: 70). The Cayman Islands is but one of many small jurisdictions, especially 
in the Caribbean, that conforms to the image of the basic tax haven. The second type of tax 
havens are offshore financial centres, which provide the same services as basic tax havens, 
but employ more people, undertake a wider range of financial services, and to some extent 
do add genuine economic value. Lists of what Palan et al. (2010) term offshore financial 
centres – and there is no single definitive list – are likely to include larger countries or 
jurisdictions with more diverse and prosperous economies, including Singapore, Switzerland, 
the UK and the USA. 
 
From a global perspective, the most important political economy consequence of tax havens 
is that they permit corporations and wealthy individuals to evade taxes. Tax burdens are 
shifted toward smaller companies, consumers and employees. The impact of tax havens on 
many developing countries is greater and more damaging: by enabling those who command 
what I have termed ‘elite political revenues’ to hide these incomes and/or launder them into 
what appear like someone’s legitimate business profits, tax havens facilitate and stimulate 
corruption, drug trafficking, diamond wars, piracy, and the theft of natural resource revenues.  
 
Attempting to become a tax haven was a sensible livelihood strategy for many micro-
territories faced with independence from colonial rule and the lack of other obvious sources 
of income or export earnings.37 Tax havens compete intensively with one another. The more 
successful tend to specialise (Palan et al. 2010). Many attempts to get into the business 
have failed. Especially since the onset of the rich world’s current fiscal crisis, tax havens 
have been subject to powerful international pressures to clean up their acts and cooperate 
more with the revenue-hungry tax authorities of the more powerful states. Switzerland, for 
example, recently has made significant concessions to the US and the UK governments by 
agreeing to levy some tax on the bank accounts held by their nationals and to hand it over en 
bloc – while still maintaining secrecy about account ownership. These international pressures 
helped block recent attempts to establish tax haven facilities in Ghana. But the temptations 
will not go away. Botswana is in the business in a small way. Other African countries will try 
to follow. Even the success of current international campaigns radically to reduce the scope 
for international tax evasion would not drive tax havens out of business.38  
 
                                                 
37  One of the reasons that the UK and the Commonwealth are so prominent in the tax haven world is that the British 
government actively encouraged its small dependencies into the business to provide them with independent economic 
means when imperial bonds were being loosened (Palan et al. 2010). 
38  The current main objectives of these campaigns are to require transnational corporations to report activities and profits 
by country and to increase the flow of information among national tax authorities: see 
www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcatart=20. 
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4.6 Sovereign transfers 
The common feature of the political revenues in this category is that they are channelled 
almost entirely to state agencies, with little going directly to political elites. For classification 
purposes, I would distinguish between direct and indirect sovereign transfers. The meaning 
of the first is self-evident: direct transfers to governments from other governments or inter-
governmental organisations. The meaning of indirect sovereign transfers is less obvious. I 
refer to the opportunities that some governments have to obtain revenues as a result of the 
emergence of global governance arrangements. A small, quirky example is the way in which 
international agreement on web domain names allows the government of Tuvalu to 
commercialise the right to use its national domain name: tv. On a somewhat larger scale, the 
surge in UN peacekeeping operations that began around 1990 provides revenue-earning 
opportunities for governments of poorer countries that command disciplined, low cost armed 
forces that are relatively free of HIV/AIDS.39 While direct and indirect sovereign transfers are 
conceptually distinct, I discuss them together here. 
 
The most significant – and the most direct and the most discussed – new political revenue 
within this category is development aid. As I explained in Section 3, the aggregate volume of 
aid both increased considerably during late twentieth century globalisation, and became 
more concentrated on the poorest countries. Further, most of those countries were suffering 
low or negative rates of growth of their economies and therefore of tax revenues. In 
consequence, aid became a major source of income for several dozen governments, mainly 
in Africa and Central America. In 2006, it was the major single source for nearly twenty of 
them.40 Again, one can see aid dependence as a sensible income-earning strategy for some 
governments – especially governments of small, poor countries that had few prospects of 
exporting manufactured products or legitimate services and whose ‘natural’ external markets 
for agricultural products were choked off by the protectionist policies of OECD countries.  
 
The impact of high levels of aid on public authority in recipient states is disputed. Statistical 
analyses find little support for fears that high levels of aid have led to a slackening of the 
efforts by recipient governments to raise their own tax revenues.41 There are however 
concerns that aid tends to weaken or fragment administrative and political institutions in 
recipient countries. These fears focused initially on the effects of donors’ insistence on 
establishing separate organisations to implement or oversee their own projects.42 That 
practice is now less common. Attention has shifted to the adverse effects of the steady and 
rapid proliferation of the number of aid channels: more donors, more aid modalities, more 
projects and, critics suggest, more dispersal of the attentions, energies and resources of 
recipient governments (Acharya et al. 2006). The proliferation of the numbers of donors and 
projects relative to the volume of aid money has continued until today (Frot and Santiso 
2010) – see also Severino and Ray (2009) – despite the Paris Declaration of 2005 and Accra 
Agenda for Action of 2008, whereby the main aid donors committed themselves to 
coordinate much more closely and to harmonise their operations to avoid unintentional 
institutional damage. Even if donors desist from establishing separate organisations to spend 
their money, and channel it through the recipient government, the intensity of their presence 
and activities in some countries still creates incentives for elites not to engage vigorously in 
building state institutions. Aid agencies, including international NGOs, provide many well-
                                                 
39  In July 2011, the largest current contributions in terms of troop numbers came from Bangladesh, Pakistan and India. 
However, Uruguay, Jordan and Rwanda provided much higher troop numbers relative to the size of their national 
populations www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.  
40  Adrian Wood estimated that, in 2006 and taking into account only countries with a population of a million people or 
more, 17 governments (15 in Africa) were receiving at least as much revenue from aid as from tax, and for a further 13 
aid revenues were between 50 per cent and 100 per cent of tax revenues (Wood 2008). 
41  See for example Gupta (2007) and Prichard (2010b). However, the quality of the data used are poor, and the alternative 
view, for which there is some statistical evidence (Knack 2009; Remmer 2004), cannot yet be rejected. 
42  Morss talked in 1984 of the ‘institutional destruction’ resulting from donor and project proliferation (Morss 1984). See 
also (Brautigam 1999; Brautigam and Knack 2004) (Cohen 1992; Godfrey et al. 2002; Leonard 1987; Wilson 1993) 
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paid jobs that stimulate a flow of administrative and technical talent from the public sector. 
Servicing the well-paid expatriate economy creates similar perverse incentives, especially in 
the more fragile states where there is a large expatriate civil or military presence. We have all 
heard about Afghan civil servants who quit their jobs for the greater material rewards of 
driving taxis around Kabul. 
 
Conventional grant or low-interest aid will continue to generate debate on these issues. It is 
however now diminishing in importance. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, where the most intense 
cases of aid dependence are to be found, a new kind of aid is now looming large. China and 
other new donors typically do not make large grants to governments. They instead finance, 
through a variety of credit arrangements, major public physical infrastructure investments. 
The public finances of the recipient countries are however deeply affected, not least because 
governments often assume long term responsibilities for repayment in the form of deliveries 
of oil or other mineral resources (Saidi and Wolf 2011). This new type of aid, labelled as 
‘development investment’ by the OECD (Saidi and Wolf 2011), is likely to have considerable 
implications for politics and governance. So too might the REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation) programme that seems to be steadily making its way 
through the UN and other international organisations, and to have attracted substantial 
advance funding commitments. The plan is to pay governments of poor countries to preserve 
or extend their forests.43 If the proposed Tobin Tax on foreign exchange transactions were 
implemented and if the proceeds were directed largely at poorer countries, that too would be 
yet another way for governments to finance themselves without the trouble of negotiating 
with taxpayers. And it is not only the governments of poor countries that can expect new 
sources of such ‘unearned revenues’ (Moore 1998). Will the auctioning of bandwidth for 
mobile telephony become the intangible equivalent of Singapore’s property development 
revenues for many other governments? And, if the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (‘Kyoto Protocol’) arrangements for trading in permissions to emit 
greenhouse gases are brought into operation, to what extent will governments be able to turn 
them into sources of revenue? (Asher 2005). 
 
5 Conclusions  
 
Over the last two decades, the governance-and-development agenda has exercised 
considerable influence over the ways in which we have classified countries politically. 
Accepting the gross simplifications intrinsic to such exercises, the identification of one distinct 
set of problem states (failed, weak, fragile) and another of aspirant problem-solvers (OECD 
aid donors) was not totally at variance with reality of the 1990s. But the usefulness and 
validity of that classification are now very much in question. What will the global governance 
map look like in another two decades? There are many ways to begin answering that 
question. The one that I present here shares with most scholarship on the general topic a 
focus on the effects of globalisation, but is otherwise heterodox – and very much exploratory. 
The existing scholarly literature on the implications of globalisation for states and public 
authority is in large part driven by the observation that globalisation increases economic 
competition, especially competition for the location of capital investment. Scholars have 
focused on whether and how the advanced capitalist states have made themselves fitter to 
compete with one another, and how and in what ways this task has been in conflict or 
consistent with some of the other structural imperatives they face, notably the need to raise 
large amounts of revenue to finance big welfare budgets and to maintain popular and 
electoral support for the ‘historic compromise’ between capital and labour that they embody. 
Many scholars believe that this competition for capital has helped change the architecture of 
the (advanced capitalist) state, as the mode of exercising authority moves away from 
                                                 
43  See www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/Default.aspx 
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command-and-control type activities initiated from within the formal state apparatus toward 
more two-way, informal exchange relationships that cross formal organisational boundaries. 
More by omission than commission, these debates have emphasised the similarities among 
advanced capitalist countries. The question of whether these processes of globalisation and 
competition might stimulate the differentiation of states has not really been on the agenda.  
I start with an empirical focus on the poorer states; with a theoretical expectation that 
globalisation and economic competition might be expected to generate processes of 
differentiation among states as well as processes of homogenisation; and with some 
analytical predispositions deriving from fiscal sociology. In particular, fiscal sociology 
suggests that states are strongly motivated to seek revenues;44 that revenue sources are 
potentially very consequential for state-society relations, the architecture of the state, and 
thus governance generally; and that the characteristic mode of financing states under 
advanced capitalism – encouraging productive private investment to order to enlarge the tax 
base – is far from the only choice historically available. Using the concept of political 
revenues – and its components state revenues and political elite revenues – I find 
considerable evidence that late twentieth century globalisation has both (a) provided many 
(non-OECD) states with a range of new state revenues in addition to ‘normal’ tax revenues 
and (b), in some cases, enhanced elite political revenues relative to state revenues. 
If my argument were even half right, what would be the implications? Here are three. 
 
(i) The expansion of non-tax state revenues  
I have cited above a range of scholars, starting from Joseph Schumpeter, who believe that 
the dependence of governments on broad general taxation is an important bulwark of 
accountable and responsive governance. It tends to generate within the state both a self-
interested concern with general prosperity of taxpayers (i.e. virtually all citizens) and a 
willingness to concede some political power to taxpayers/citizens in return for their more 
willing compliance with established or new tax demands. The tax and fiscal states about 
which Schumpeter wrote, and the capitalist economic and political institutions of which they 
were a fundamental part, were constructed on the basis of a relatively clear division of 
labour: the state controlled few significant income-earning assets and was dependent for its 
income on taxing private enterprise; and most of the mobile, investible capital assets were in 
private hands. That division of labour in turn created the basis for a productive bargain 
between political power and private capital: investors would obtain protection for their 
property rights and general support from the state in profit-seeking; and their investments 
would provide the holders of political power with tax revenue, the economic prosperity that 
makes ruling so much easier most of the time, and various types of political funding or 
private benefits (Bates 2001; Moore and Schmitz 2008). This bargain is not itself intrinsically 
democratic, but it has provided the material foundations and incentives on which all 
sustainable contemporary democracies have been constructed – notably the in-built 
constraints on arbitrary state action and the perceived mutual advantages for states and 
organized citizens to bargain rather than war with one another. Where political authorities 
have owned the lion’s share of income-generating assets – whether under various forms of 
‘feudalism’, state capitalism, centrally-planned state socialism or in contemporary oil-rich 
rentier states (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Mahdavy 1970) – democracy and civil liberties 
have not flourished. If there is indeed a widespread contemporary trend for governments to 
fund themselves from non-tax sources – oil, gas and minerals, property development, aid, 
sovereign wealth funds, international shipping registrations, REDD (Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) or the management of carbon trading emissions 
                                                 
44  I do not mean to suggest that revenue is the sole or dominant driver of state behaviour. I find very useful Crawford 
Young’s list of those drivers: hegemony, autonomy, security, legitimacy, revenue and accumulation (Young 1994:  
35–40).  
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certificates45 – or from taxes levied on wealthy non-resident foreigners (tax havens), then, in 
the absence of more effective global institutions, the other political mechanisms that help 
keep states accountable and responsive to their citizens, notably political and electoral 
activism, might be called on to do even more of the work. 
 
(ii) The expansion of elite political revenues  
I believe that the recent expansion of elite political revenues is a significant part of the 
explanation of the contemporary phenomenon of weak, fragile or failed states. In polities in 
which elite political revenues are relatively abundant, power lies in the hands of people who 
often lack incentives to do state-building: to construct or nurture the institutions that might 
mobilise large numbers of citizens into politics (political parties), encourage political 
bargaining between different interest groups (legislatures), collect revenue for public 
purposes (tax agencies), make informed policy decisions and implement them consistently 
(civil services), protect citizens against crime and illegal force (police, judiciaries, prison 
services) or provide the technical support needed to hold government to account for the use 
of public money (public audit offices). Late twentieth century globalisation has not only 
shifted the financing of some peripheral states away from general tax revenues toward what 
Schumpeter might have termed domain revenues, but it has also created many opportunities 
and temptations for political elites to invest in the harvesting of illicit elite revenues – by 
engaging in or facilitating drug production and trafficking, money laundering, tax evasion, the 
sale of government contracts to the giver of the highest bribe – or even simply smoothing the 
way of aid donors and their projects through the public service in return for lucrative 
consultancy assignments. Because of globalisation, sources of such revenues are more 
abundant. Liberal international finance, most strikingly in the shape of tax havens, has made 
it easier and cheaper to hide illicit incomes, and thus has increased incentives to earn them. 
The growing transnationalisation of elite culture, including the practice of educating children 
in the USA or some other rich country, also shifts the balance of elite incentives toward 
keeping illicit money offshore in the knowledge that, should the political basis for 
moneymaking at home disappear, a materially good life will be available in some other part 
of the world. The re-commercialisation of military capacity has made it possible for 
exploitative, authoritarian elites to remain in power even if they enjoy little domestic 
legitimacy or support.46 Overall, their incentives to create or nurture formal state institutions 
are unusually weak.47 
 
The widespread failure of attempts to establish state-like political order is not unusual. 
Indeed, it is the historical norm (Scott 2009). But historically, weak political authorities tended 
not to survive long. The political uncertainty and instability that typically follows war or 
internal conflict elicited a drive toward political resolution. Different interests and parties 
competed actively for state power. Either one party emerged as dominant or public authority 
was re-established through compromise between the leading contenders. A distinctive 
feature of the situation in some parts of the contemporary world is that these processes of 
                                                 
45  I am not assuming that all these sources of non-tax revenues will continue to increase in significance. For example, 
current rapid progress in creating a larger, more diverse and more flexible global gas supply system, largely through 
extraction of shale gas and the expansion of the infrastructure for dealing with liquefied gas, may significantly dent the 
size of the rents that governments can extract from oil and gas exports (International Energy Agency 2011). 
46  The Qaddafi regime in Libya survived the initial upsurge of popular opposition in March 2011 in large part because it 
had its mercenaries ready for just such an event, some of them already in the country, and others available to be flown 
in.  
47  These issues are complex, and rarely explored in detail. Elites that exercise some influence in or through state 
institutions typically will not want to demolish those institutions entirely. Briscoe and Pellecer usefully (Briscoe and 
Pellecer 2010) ame their analysis of state weakness and failure in contemporary Guatemala along dialectical lines. 
While criminal and drug networks infiltrate and enfeeble many parts of the state apparatus and the private sector, 
powerful private sector interests need and support many functioning aspects of the state (Briscoe and Pellecer 2010). 
For further discussion of the phenomenon of the intentional destruction of state capacity by political elites, see Mathew 
and Moore (2011). 
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resolution and of re-establishment of effective public authority are weak and slow. Failing 
governments have not always been ousted militarily or supplanted by expanding 
neighbouring states. Weak governance and continuous internal conflict have become 
routine. For every case of apparently successful resolution, like Sierra Leone,48 there are 
several where success is not yet in sight. A major generic reason is that, if they can continue 
to act as rent-taking gatekeepers, elites lack strong incentives put an end to weak 
governance or disorder, and may actively profit from it (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Duffield 
1998; Munkler 2005). Control of rent-taking nodes becomes more rewarding than ruling 
territory and population through the contemporary state institutions with which we are most 
familiar. 
 
There are direct policy implications of this analysis. Many of the underlying global causes of 
the weak and failed state phenomenon are amenable to constructive action at the 
international and global levels. And most are already on international policy agendas, even if 
only weakly so (OECD 2011; World Bank 2011): further transparency about the revenues 
that governments receive from all stages of the natural resource extraction process; the 
wider adoption and enforcement of international anti-corruption protocols; better regulation of 
private military companies and arms trading; tighter regulation of tax havens; cheaper, 
quicker and more automatic arrangements for information exchange among national tax 
authorities to facilitate tracking down illicit money; improved schemes for stolen-asset 
recovery; better monitoring of the sources and uses of tropical hardwoods; and changes in 
the current punitive but ineffective international drug control regime to reduce the very high 
current profit opportunities.   
 
 (iii) The financialisation of capitalism 
Friendly critics49 have suggested that, despite the apparent radicalism of my arguments here, 
I give too much credence to some conventional assumptions, including some associated with 
the old governance-and-development agenda that I rejected at the outset. These include: the 
notion that OECD states are, and will remain, relatively undifferentiated and similar to one 
another; the expectation that those OECD states, acting collectively, will exercise a benign 
influence on governance elsewhere in the world; and the stereotyping of the elites only of 
poor countries as being venal or dysfunctional. I plead a bit guilty, especially of not looking 
enough to the future, and to the likely impact of financialisation. Financialisation – the 
increasing influence of financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of domestic and international economies50 – has been a prominent feature of late 
twentieth century globalisation (Dore 2008; Epstein 2005), and seems set to continue. Were 
it to do so, two incipient contemporary politico-economic trends would likely be intensified. 
First, we should expect OECD states to become increasingly diverse, with those dependent 
on active finance capitalism (the UK, the USA) looking increasingly different – and possibly 
defining their interests differently – from manufacturing nations like Germany. Second, and 
related, we might see more convergence – in interests, attitudes and policies – between 
wealthy elites from all parts of the globe – and probably even more face-to-face interaction 
among them in London and New York. They would likely define their common interests 
above all in terms of continuing and extending current arrangements that enable them to 
move large personal fortunes around the world and to pay low or zero taxes. That implies the 
                                                 
48  But see Maconachie and Hilson (2011). 
49  Max Everest-Phillips and Ronen Palan. Thanks. 
50  Scholars label and define financialization in different ways. One useful definition is: ‘the increasing dominance of the 
finance industry in the sum total of economic activity, of financial controllers in the management of corporations, of 
financial assets among total assets, of marketised securities and particularly equities among financial assets, of the 
stock market as a market for corporate control in determining corporate strategies, and of fluctuations in the stock 
market as a determinant of business cycles’ (Dore 2000). Braudel’s concept of disembedded capitalism points in the 
same direction: capitalism is ‘a series of layers built on top of the everyday market economy of onions and wood, 
plumbing and cooking. These layers, local, regional, national and global, are characterized by ever greater abstraction, 
until at the top sits disembodied finance, seeking returns anywhere, uncommitted to any particular place or industry, and 
commodifying anything and everything’ (Mulgan 2009).  
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further development of another correlate of late twentieth century globalisation: rising income 
inequality within almost every political jurisdiction. But this takes us well beyond any 
governance agenda likely to be embraced by official international organisations, and so is a 
good point to stop. 
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